Interview with Juan Pablo Cárdenas (2008)
In the 1990s, the right-wing Concertación governments adopted a policy of annihilating the centre-left print media that had laboriously emerged in the 1980s in opposition to the dictatorship. Basically, this was done by maintaining the discrimination in state advertising that had naturally existed during the dictatorship and by blocking external financial aid. This was referred to by the National Journalism Prize winner and former editor of Análisis magazine, Juan Pablo Cárdenas, in an interview with the Freedom of Expression Bulletin of the Institute of Communication and Image (ICEI) of the University of Chile in March 2008. Obviously, as these media outlets no longer existed, this interview has remained completely unknown to the general population. Here is an excerpt from the most noteworthy parts.
The painful truth
“I have always argued that there was a policy by the Concertación governments to exterminate media outlets opposed to the dictatorship (…) I believe that at this point there can be no doubt about it: there were operations, resources and operators clearly aimed in that direction. Each of those media outlets disappeared at different times as a result of that policy.
The magazine Apsi, which had links to the Socialist Party and was much more closely linked to the groups that formed part of the government, survived longer. This was not the case with Análisis, which was completely independent… But not even Apsi could survive, as the policy was merciless towards anyone who had a certain level of independence and was seen as a threat! The assessment here was brilliant.
I believe that masterminds such as (Edgardo) Boeninger and Enrique Correa were the architects of this policy. They must have thought: “Sooner or later, these media outlets are going to start opposing us, and it is better to reach some kind of agreement with the traditional media, which are overwhelmed by their faults and debts, than to help these outlets”. I even believe that a special relationship was established with El Mercurio that continues to this day (2008). (…)
It has been said repeatedly that it was the market that killed these publications and although each case has its differences, I can say that the end of Análisis was not due to the market but to a political decision taken during the government of Patricio Aylwin, specifically in the Ministry of the Interior.
At that time, the government began the process of taking over Análisis, which culminated in the deception of several of the magazine’s directors, whose shares were bought out, allowing the undersecretary of the interior, Belisario Velasco, to appoint new authorities to the magazine, who then decided to close it down (…) I know the main people responsible.
A meeting was held in Belisario Velasco’s office, at which Fernando Castillo Velasco, Patricio Hurtado and Oscar Saavedra were summoned to sell their shares in exchange for two million pesos each. Obviously, this was done on the understanding that the magazine would be strengthened.
Carlos Bascuñán, Patricio Aylwin’s son-in-law, was also involved in the operation. They were the operators, but when you talk to the directors of other media outlets, you realise that they were not the only ones.
In the case of Página Abierta, for example, the operator was Enrique Correa, who bought the shares (…) Furthermore, everything indicates that the operation was carried out with confidential government funds, since it required funds to buy shares, compensate all the journalists for their dismissal, and settle all the financial commitments that the magazine had outstanding at the time of its closure. It would have been very unusual for people in the government, with their own resources, to buy publications and then shortly afterwards decide to close them down, covering the costs themselves. (…)
(To save the magazine) in a desperate move, I offered the new board members – who had taken over through the shares they had acquired – to withdraw, paying them what they had invested and leaving us journalists as the sole owners of the publication. But they refused. Then they proposed the strange formula that I continue as editor for a year, putting my name on it, but that I leave for any European country I wanted, keeping my salary. Of course, I did not accept. Then they offered me compensation for years of service (…) Then, with part of the magazine’s team, we formed another media outlet that also had many difficulties. (…)
“The magazine was also in a very good position. Of course, we had started to experience difficulties, but at the end of Pinochet’s government we were running healthy numbers, as accountants say. Then we began to accumulate some debts in the hope that we would get state advertising, which was denied to us from the outset, and in the expectation that we would get advertising from companies as a way of supporting the magazines, which also did not materialise.
As a result, we accumulated a deficit, but it wasn’t worrying; (…) (and with regard to obtaining state advertising) we tried to exhaust all avenues. Apart from that, we had dozens of meetings with the heads of state-owned companies to request advertising directly, and nothing happened.
The only help we received was a notice from the Polla Chilena de Beneficencia, thanks to Orlando Cantuarias, who was in charge at the time. (…) We made many efforts to keep the magazine alive. The most emblematic was one that we did not undertake ourselves, but rather the Dutch government, through the minister who came to represent her government at the handover of power.
She met with the directors of the magazines Hoy, Apsi and Análisis, and the newspapers Fortín Mapocho and La Época, to offer us one last, albeit very substantial, aid package so that these magazines and newspapers could consolidate during the transition, which they foresaw as difficult.
We were informed that this assistance would be provided through a report to be drafted by a consultant sent by the Dutch government to analyse the situation of each of the media outlets.
This consultant arrived two weeks later, worked for a little over a month and formed an opinion on the real needs.
As far as Análisis was concerned, the consultant asked me how much money was needed to consolidate the magazine during the first four years of the transition. I gave him a figure of 250,000 dollars, which I estimated would be necessary to get us out of the quagmire in the coming years. He told me that he was in a position to give us much more money. Specifically, he offered us 500,000 dollars, which I accepted.
A few days later, the Dutch ambassador called me to say that he was in a position to issue the cheque for this aid, but he told me that I had to resolve the problem raised by the Chilean government, which maintained that any aid to the media in this country would be seen as undue interference in the internal affairs of Chile, a democratic country.
He told me that they had approached the editors of the three magazines and that they had acted independently from the editors of the newspapers. So the three editors went to speak with Enrique Correa, who was then Minister Secretary General of the Government.
Correa said that this was a misunderstanding and that it could be resolved with a phone call from him. But he never made that call, nor any government official made it, and the ambassador got tired of waiting until he notified us that they were interested in supporting the media, but also interested in having good relations with the government (…)
This was also confirmed in a curious encounter I had at a reception at the Norwegian embassy, where the Norwegian ambassador, who had already been in Chile and had been reappointed for his contribution to the democratic struggle, confronted a person (…) saying to me: “Look, director, I want to tell you in front of all these people that this man here was part of a commission that travelled throughout Europe sayin in each country that any aid to the media and NGOs would be considered undue interference in Chile’s internal affairs” (…)
I can attest that this commission existed, and the consequences of its actions are clear (…) I am tired of saying it, of raising it at conferences, of writing about it… in fact, in the special edition marking the 30th anniversary of the creation of Análisis last December (2007), some of those names appear. I have repeatedly mentioned the people who were involved in the operation, as I am doing now, and I have never received a denial. (…)
In our desperation, the editors of the three magazines – Marcelo Rozas, Marcelo Contreras and myself – left, in view of the delay by the Secretary General of the Government, who had promised us help and state publicity, to talk to Aylwin’s Minister of Finance, Alejandro Foxley.
We told him everything we had been through with the Dutch government’s blocking of funds. Foxley held his head in his hands and said he couldn’t understand such a thing. He said that they were there, among other things, because of the exemplary struggle of the journalists. “I can see you are very stressed, I am going to help you,” he said.
He called Pablo Piñera, who was his undersecretary and is now (2008) the manager of the Central Bank, to his office, and after whispering to him, he asked us how much aid the Dutch government had provided. I told him that in the case of Análisis, it was 500,000 dollars. He asked us what we thought about the three magazines receiving the same amount. He talked about creating a mechanism with Pablo Piñera to give us that money. Then he said, “Now go, have a drink to my health and have a good weekend (it was Friday).”
On Tuesday, the secretary general of the government, Enrique Correa, unexpectedly summoned the three directors and the three managers to a closed-door meeting in his office. As it was with the managers, we naively thought it was to finalise the announcements.
To our astonishment, however, he berated us, threatened us with hellfire and warned us that none of the three media outlets would receive a penny of aid, pointing out that he considered himself deeply offended by the fact that we had raised this issue with the Minister of Finance and had not waited for the good offices he was undertaking to resolve the problem of the democratic media. He was referring to negotiations he was hypothetically conducting with the Italian government, which would mean better aid than that offered by the Dutch government. At that point, we understood that he was completely full of hot air. That was the situation. (…)
On one occasion, I received a curious invitation to the office of Aylwin’s Minister of Public Works, Carlos Hurtado. In his office, where a lunch was held with media directors, I was asked what had happened with Análisis. I was already working for Los Tiempos magazine at the time. I gave them a broad outline of my version of events. As we were leaving, the then editor of La Segunda – now (2008) of El Mercurio – Cristián Zegers, said to me: “Juan Pablo, aren’t you going to report what you just said? Would you be willing to give me an interview for La Segunda?”. I said yes and pointed out that it would be better to do some journalistic research on all this first. For that purpose, I could provide the names and the notary’s office where the transactions took place. And that after the investigation, I would give him the interview.
Zegers then appointed a journalist who contacted me and would do the same with government officials. Two or three days later, Zegers called me and said that unfortunately they couldn’t do anything because “this was leaked and you know the connections we have with the authorities; I congratulate you for having the courage to report it, but I am very sorry to say that I can’t do anything”.
The media and the Journalists’ Association have refused to report these events to this day” (2008 and 2021… and 2025).
Translated from Spanish by David Meléndez Tormen
