As the recent visit has been made by the Bangladeshi delegation in Kolkata for the 90th and final routine meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) under the 1996 Ganges Treaty, a crucial dilemma looms over the subcontinent, and nowhere more urgently than in the fading villages of Southwest Bangladesh. Can this three-decade-old agreement be redesigned to provide a fair water future for a country where a single dry-season flow failure drives thousands more farmers into poverty? The outcome will decide not only the fate of the Padma River but also the life of an entire region, as the agreement is scheduled to expire in December 2026. A treaty running out of time, because the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty was groundbreaking for its time. Signed on December 12, 1996, it established a formula-based allocation for dry-season flows (January to May) measured at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal. The mechanism appeared elegantly simple, when flows at Farakka fall below 70,000 cusecs, both countries share equally; between 70,000–75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs; above 75,000 cusecs, India takes 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh the remainder. However, this framework is increasingly disconnected from hydrological reality. The treaty relies on historical flow data from 1949 to 1988, a baseline that has been disrupted by climate change. Most critically, when flows drop below 50,000 cusecs, the treaty offers no enforceable allocation mechanism precisely at the very moment when Bangladesh’s southwest needs protection most.
By Imran Hossain
Southwest Bangladesh: The Frontline of the Water Crisis
For the people of Khulna, Satkhira, Jessore, Bagerhat, and the Sundarbans, the Ganges Treaty is more than just a diplomatic concept. It is the difference between drinking water and dialysis, between golden rice paddies and cracked, saline earth. The Ganges-Padma river system culminates in the Southwest region. Seawater from the Bay of Bengal rushes persistently inland due to decreased dry-season flows. The consequence is a slow-motion ecological disaster. During the dry season, the average salinity of the soil in Satkhira and Khulna is now 6–8 dS/m, which is significantly higher than the 2 dS/m criterion for rice cultivation. Over the past decade, Traditional aman and boro rice yields have fallen by 40–60%. The drinking water crisis has become acute, as shallow tubewells in 15 southwestern upazilas deliver brackish water for six months of the year. Villages like Shyamnagar and Assasuni now rely on reverse osmosis plants where they exist, or rainwater harvesting, which fails during dry spells.
The Sundarbans, the world’s largest mangrove forest and a UNESCO World Heritage site, requires a minimum freshwater inflow to maintain its delicate salinity gradient. Flow reduction below 1,500 cumecs at the Gorai River intake triggers measurable tree extinction and habitat loss for the Royal Bengal tiger. The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics reports that since 2018, over 800,000 people from Khulna and Satkhira have migrated internally, citing water scarcity and livelihood collapse as primary drivers. The 2025 cyclone Remal demonstrated how weakened mangroves lead to deeper coastal inundation. The Gorai River, the main distributary supplying Southwest Bangladesh, ran at fewer than 200 cusecs during the 2024 dry season, when the Ganges flow at Farakka fell to 48,000 cusecs for 47 consecutive days. Farmers saw their shrimp ghers (ponds) become too salty for tiger prawns, and then too salty for even the resilient white-leg shrimp. In Mongla, barge operators dredged mud that should have been scoured by the current. Women walked 8 kilometers daily to reach the last functional government pond. This is not a future risk. This is now.
What Bangladesh Is Demanding
Dhaka has entered these negotiations with reasonable, region-specific demands. First, Bangladesh is requesting flow assurances specific to salinity, such as a minimum dry-season release of 25,000 cusecs at Farakka and an escalation provision that increases the required flow in response to observed salinity levels at Khulna’s intake sites. This directly addresses the southwest crisis. Second, Bangladesh seeks a revised measurement framework that accounts for upstream withdrawals across the entire Ganga basin, not merely for flows at Farakka. Data from March 2026 shows net Ganga flow entering Bangladesh was 22% lower than the Farakka records indicated, due to unmeasured extraction in Bihar and West Bengal. Third, Dhaka wants the Gorai River to be jointly monitored in real time. According to the 2025 Gorai Feasibility Study, dredging cannot maintain flow on its own without ensuring upstream release.
India’s Legitimate Concerns
India’s position deserves fair consideration. New Delhi notes that the infrastructure, measurement procedures, and verifiable data at Farakka make it impossible to ignore current flow realities. Extending the measuring framework upstream would result in the introduction of complicated variables and may lead to never-ending technical disagreements on attribution. Furthermore, India also has justifiable requirements for growth. The major reason the Farakka Barrage was built was to keep the Kolkata Port navigable. Since 1996, West Bengal’s irrigation needs have increased dramatically, especially in the districts of Murshidabad and Nadia. Indian officials point to the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, which is currently “in abeyance” due to cross-border tensions, as evidence that India’s cooperative approach with Bangladesh should not be taken for granted.
A Feasible Path Forward That Protects the Southwest
Despite these differences, a fair and durable agreement remains achievable. The JRC mechanism, established in 1972, bargains a reliable institutional foundation in both sides trust. Recent technical meetings in March and April 2026 have reaffirmed commitments to data exchange. Here is what a renewed treaty could realistically include, with specific protection for Southwest Bangladesh.
First, a Southwest Flow Reserve. Modeled on environmental water reserves like in the Murray-Darling Basin (Australia), the treaty could designate 8,000-10,000 cusecs of India’s allocation as “salinity mitigation flow,” released only during February-April when Gorai salinity peaks. This does not reduce India’s total share, but re-times the release for maximum ecological benefit. Second, climate-adaptive allocation with a salinity trigger. Instead of fixed thresholds based on historical data, the new treaty should incorporate real-time flow measurements and a dynamic sharing ratio that becomes more favorable to Bangladesh as salinity at Khulna monitoring stations exceeds 2 dS/m. This would directly link Indian releases to measurable hardship in the southwest. Third, a joint basin-wide management framework with authority to monitor diversions. A compromise solution would establish a Joint River Basin Organization responsible for Gorai River health, with Bangladesh accepting third-party technical verification of upstream extraction data in exchange for India’s commitment to publish real-time Farakka releases. Fourth, guaranteed minimum flows with climate escalation clauses. The new treaty should establish an enforceable minimum of 25,000 cusecs to Bangladesh, something the 1996 agreement lacks, below 50,000 cusecs. This minimum could be ratcheted upward based on measured climate impacts, linking India’s cooperation to global climate finance. Fifth, a Southwest Adaptation Fund. Both countries could contribute a formula-based amount, perhaps $15–20 million annually, to finance saline-resistant crop research, community rainwater harvesting, and managed retreat programs in Khulna and Satkhira. This transforms the treaty from a water-splitting exercise into a genuine regional resilience framework.
A fair treaty serves both nations. For India, water cooperation demonstrates regional reliability, contrasting with China’s upstream unilateralism on the Brahmaputra. For Bangladesh, predictable flows enable agriculture, depending largely on the treaty’s continuation. But for Southwest Bangladesh, the stakes are existential: every year without renewal means more abandoned ponds, more freshwater loss in the Sundarbans, and more families fleeing to Dhaka’s slums. The 90th JRC meeting in Kolkata, including a Farakka site inspection, is a chance to show two democracies sharing 54 rivers can manage scarcity with equity, and that downstream communities are not residuals of an upstream bargain. We know the 1996 treaty ended a volatile dispute, but achievements require renewal. As the December 2026 deadline nears, negotiators must remember: the river does not recognize borders, nor does suffering. When Shyamnagar’s people walk 8 kilometers for water, they ask whether fairness, the only foundation for lasting cooperation, remains possible. A renewed treaty protecting the southwest’s vulnerability is essential. The water future of 10 million coastal Bangladeshis and India’s reputation as a cooperative neighbor depend on getting this right.
Imran Hossain, Lecturer, Department of Business Administration, Bangladesh Army International University of Science and Technology (BAIUST), (MBA), (BBA), University of Rajshahi.
