The new Action Plan on International AI Ethical Governance, unveiled in Shanghai during the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference, extends far beyond the technological sphere. It constitutes a proposal to define who will establish the rules governing the development of artificial intelligence over the coming decades and reflects a distinct conception of the international order, the role of the State, and the place that developing countries should occupy in the technological revolution.
By Claudia Aranda
For decades, geopolitics was shaped by control over territory, natural resources, maritime routes, and military capability. In the twenty-first century, those factors remain decisive, but a new dimension of power has emerged above them: the capacity to develop, train, regulate, and govern artificial intelligence.
The issue is no longer simply who builds the most advanced models or manufactures the most sophisticated semiconductors. The competition also revolves around who will write the rules that will govern the operation of this technology for the rest of the world.
With that objective, China unveiled an Action Plan on International AI Ethical Governance on July 17, 2026, during the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) held in Shanghai. The document was prepared under the coordination of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and is explicitly framed within the United Nations Pact for the Future and the Global Digital Compact.
This decision is far from incidental. While much of the international debate continues to focus on technological competition between the United States and China, Beijing seeks to place another issue at the center of the global agenda: the construction of an international architecture for governing artificial intelligence before its development permanently outpaces the regulatory capacity of States.
The distinction is profound. From China’s perspective, artificial intelligence is not merely a strategic industry or a market of immense economic value. It is a civilizational infrastructure destined to transform production, education, medicine, scientific research, public administration, finance, transportation, security, and virtually every sphere of human activity. For this very reason, Beijing argues that its development cannot be determined solely by commercial interests or corporate competition, but instead requires governance capable of safeguarding the global public good.
From this perspective, ethics ceases to be a collection of abstract principles and becomes a political technology. Governing artificial intelligence ethically means deciding how it will be designed, who will bear responsibility when harm occurs, which risks will be considered acceptable, and who will participate in defining those rules.
One of the central concepts of the plan is the establishment of governance throughout the entire life cycle of artificial intelligence. Although the expression may appear highly technical, it represents a significant departure from traditional regulatory approaches. Rather than supervising only finished products, the proposal calls for oversight mechanisms beginning at the very origin of every system. This encompasses data acquisition, training processes, model design, safety testing, deployment, subsequent updates, and even the eventual withdrawal of systems whose risks can no longer be effectively managed.
In practice, this means that responsibility no longer rests exclusively with the end user. Developers, data providers, technology companies, research institutions, and regulatory authorities all share responsibilities throughout the technological development process. Artificial intelligence therefore ceases to be viewed merely as a commercial product and instead becomes a comprehensive chain of shared accountability.
Another fundamental pillar is the classification of risks according to categories and levels. The underlying logic is straightforward: not every artificial intelligence system presents the same potential for harm. A model designed to translate documents does not pose the same risks as one capable of operating critical energy infrastructure, financial systems, medical diagnostics, or military decision-making. Consequently, the plan proposes regulatory obligations proportional to the potential impact of each application, avoiding both insufficient oversight and sweeping prohibitions that could hinder innovation.
The document also introduces the concept of agile governance. China recognizes that technological development advances far more rapidly than traditional legislative processes. A law may require years of parliamentary debate, whereas an artificial intelligence model can evolve within months—or even weeks. In response, the plan advocates regulatory mechanisms capable of continuous adaptation through technical standards, ongoing evaluation, and institutional coordination. Regulation is therefore conceived not as a static legal text, but as a dynamic and evolving process.
Another particularly significant aspect is the strengthening of a collaborative ecosystem. Under the Chinese approach, artificial intelligence is not viewed as the exclusive domain of major technology corporations. Universities, public laboratories, research institutes, manufacturing industries, open-source developers, international organizations, and governments are all considered integral parts of a single innovation chain. This reflects a longstanding characteristic of China’s development model, in which state planning seeks to coordinate capacities across multiple sectors in order to accelerate technological innovation.
Within this context, particular importance is attached to research on explainability, privacy protection, and bias mitigation. Explainability seeks to address one of the most complex questions in contemporary artificial intelligence: is it possible to understand how a model reached a particular conclusion? As AI systems become increasingly sophisticated, many of their decisions function as genuine “black boxes.” The plan therefore identifies as a priority the development of technologies capable of making these internal processes understandable while simultaneously strengthening personal data protection and reducing algorithmic discrimination.
Equally noteworthy is the explicit support for technological exchange and open-source development in areas related to security, transparency, and explainability. At a time marked by trade restrictions, export controls, and intensifying technological competition, this position seeks to project an image of international scientific cooperation while enabling countries with more limited technological capabilities to participate in the development of advanced AI tools.
The plan also incorporates a social dimension extending well beyond engineering. It proposes integrating scientific and technological ethics into the national education system, specifically safeguarding the rights and interests of women, children, older adults, and persons with disabilities, while reducing the digital divide. From China’s perspective, artificial intelligence should not deepen existing inequalities but rather serve as an instrument for expanding human development opportunities.
Perhaps the most significant element from a geopolitical perspective is the plan’s insistence on strengthening cooperation with developing countries. The document proposes expanding regulatory capacities, sharing institutional experience, and facilitating access to technical knowledge so that AI governance does not become concentrated within a small number of advanced economies. This orientation is closely connected to other initiatives promoted by China over the past decade, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and expanding technological cooperation with Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
This approach contrasts with the trajectory followed by the United States. Although Washington has also developed regulatory initiatives and recognizes the need to address risks associated with artificial intelligence, it has historically assigned a predominant role to private-sector dynamism and the preservation of technological leadership. Major corporations have played a central role in developing the world’s most advanced models, while public policy has combined regulation, innovation incentives, and measures designed to protect strategic capabilities, including export controls on high-performance semiconductors.
China advances a different approach. It argues that international governance should not be built solely around technological competition, but rather through multilateral mechanisms capable of establishing shared rules for the future development of artificial intelligence. From this perspective, regulation is not viewed as an obstacle to innovation but as a necessary condition for ensuring its long-term sustainability and for distributing its benefits more broadly.
Ultimately, the debate extends far beyond technology itself. What is now beginning to take shape is the normative architecture of the twenty-first century. The rules established today will determine who controls data, who sets international standards, who bears responsibility for technological risks, and who participates in the distribution of the benefits generated by artificial intelligence.
The plan presented in Shanghai reflects China’s determination to play an active role in shaping that architecture. Rather than merely responding to immediate technological competition, it seeks to occupy a central position in defining the rules of the emerging international digital order. The debate is no longer simply about who develops the most powerful artificial intelligence. The decisive question is who will possess the authority to define the rules under which that intelligence will ultimately transform the world.
Sources
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China (MIIT). Official statements on the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference.
Xinhua News Agency. “Action Plan on International AI Ethical Governance,” July 17, 2026.
United Nations. Pact for the Future and Global Digital Compact, 2024.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Global AI Governance Action Plan, 2025.
World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) 2026. Official speeches and conference documents.
