Japan’s imperial ambitions in Pacific Asia from the 1880s to 1945 were shaped by a web of strategic alliances, racial politics, and great-power rivalries that ultimately drew it into World War II.
Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirović
Japan and Southeast Asia
From the 1880s until 1945, Japan pursued a determined imperial policy of maintaining its military and political supremacy over China, or at least over most of it. What America, Asia, and Africa were to Western European imperial colonizers, China and later Southeast Asia were (or at least were supposed to be) to Japan. However, in pursuing its imperial endeavors in China and Southeast Asia, and following the example of Western colonizers and imperialists, including the United States, Japan was hampered by the imperial jealousy of the Western great powers, who believed that they alone had the right to a monopoly on the exploitation of China and the countries south of it in Pacific Asia. However, by laying claim to China and the Pacific Basin, Japan clearly risked increasing the opposition, and even hostility, of the Western powers. It was clear to Japan that these powers would not voluntarily leave it alone to do what these powers had already done long before it in the same geographical area. Japan discovered, first of all, at the end of the 19th century that the Western powers would not leave it carte blanche for its imperial undertakings in China, and above all in Manchuria, not because they had any sympathy for China, but primarily because they were against Japan’s military, political, and economic rise, which Japan could not, following the example of the Western colonial powers, carry out without creating its own colonial empire.
To achieve its imperial goal in this part of the world (for the rest of the world, Japan was not interested), Japan had to resort to the oldest means of diplomacy. Surrounded by a group of cruel Western colonial powers that had already divided up the territory of Pacific Asia among themselves, Tokyo decided to split its united front by courting a major Western power as its ally and friend. In the domestic public, this policy was presented as nationally beneficial in exchange for the patronage (protection) of that Western power. In other words, at the very beginning of the 20th century, Japan believed that if it managed to gain the friendship and protection of one of the leading world powers of the time, for which it was prepared to pay the appropriate price in one form or another, it would be able to contain all other powers against it and thus avoid being forced, as in 1895 (after the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, in which it defeated China), to give up its main demands regarding China temporarily.
Japan’s diplomatic dilemma around the year of 1900
The crucial question now arose: Which great Western power could this be, despite the general view of Japan as a newcomer to the politics of Pacific Asia? In other words, the basic diplomatic and geopolitical problem for Japan around the year of 1900 was how Tokyo would be able to provide a great power, in principle a Western one, with evidence that it would accept certain risks if it agreed to bilateral friendship and cooperation with Japan. However, opinions in Tokyo were divided on this issue.
In fact, it was generally accepted in Japan that Japan’s ultimate national enemy, which fought against all Japanese imperial claims in the Pacific, was its immediate overseas neighbor – Russia. However, a number of Japanese experts on the geopolitics of Pacific Asia advocated easing tensions in Japan’s diplomatic relations with Tsarist Russia. This party, when it came to power in Tokyo, began negotiations with Russia on the peaceful coexistence of Russia with Japan. Nonetheless, another geopolitical school in Tokyo was in favor of an alliance between Japan and Imperial Germany. This fit in with that party’s program of modernizing Japan on the basis of the German experience: constitution, army, etc. In the following years, the shaping of Japanese foreign policy depended on the level of Japanese contact with Imperial Germany, which was in favor of establishing much closer ties with Japan at all levels.
Nevertheless, in Japan, another school of thought finally prevailed in the country’s foreign policy orientation, favoring reliance on its navy. The arguments were that Japan was an island country and that it was a maritime power in the Pacific Ocean. The proponents of this school felt that Japan should follow its predetermined geopolitical destiny and that it therefore had to accept a maritime solution to its foreign policy problems. Thus, Japan finally decided to tie its geopolitical destiny to Great Britain. Thus, two thalassocracies (the ancient Greek expression for the master of the sea), one as a world and the other as a regional maritime power, were joining forces to achieve their geopolitical goals in the Pacific Ocean region.
There were three main geopolitical reasons for Japan’s turn towards Great Britain as a strategic partner at the very beginning of the 20th century:
Japan, considering that it was separated from the landmass of Asia, was aware that its way of life in foreign policy was very similar to the British thalassocracy because Britain, as an island country, separated from continental Europe, was also oriented towards the sea and the creation of an overseas (maritime) empire.
The geographical factor of attraction of Japan’s alliance with Great Britain was considerably reinforced in Tokyo by the emotional reaction. Namely, the political attitudes of the great Western colonial powers towards Japan since the forced opening of Japan to international trade in 1853/1868 were marked by the limitation of its land activities, i.e.,g., by the limitation of the Japanese occupation of parts of China in the war of 1894‒1895, and in some Western European circles by a cultural policy based on racial grounds, expressed in the term “Yellow danger”.
The agreement with Great Britain not only promised a political alliance between the two powers in the Pacific Ocean, but also erased the feeling of earlier humiliation towards Japan by London and thereby created a friendly mood with the world’s strongest naval power (thalassocracy) at that time.
Thus, in 1902, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded, primarily and only, against Tsarist Russia, and it provided Japan with the world partner it had longed for at the time.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was one of the most significant political events in Japan’s history. A complex diplomatic process preceded the alliance, and it was the key to everything that took place in Pacific Asia in the following period. At least as far as Japan was concerned, this alliance, in fact against Russia, represented a neutralizing arrangement. The text of the alliance included that if one of the two signatories of the alliance (Japan) entered into war with one great power (Russia), the other signatory (Great Britain) must indicate that it would join the side of its ally if attacked by another foreign power (Russia). The net military gain for Japan from this treaty was that it was effectively spared the situation of having to fight with more than one enemy (Russia). Thus, the neutrality of the other great powers was ensured, and Japan itself had the direct support of Great Britain in the event of a war with Russia.
Specifically, Japan could safely go to war with Russia within the framework of this treaty because, in that case, it would be sure that another great power would not attack it, and it would also have the support of Great Britain.
The essence of this alliance was that if Japan went to war with Russia (and Japan was preparing for aggression against Russia), the military forces of Great Britain would go to war against any ally of Russia or any other enemy of Japan, which ensured the neutrality of all other great powers in the Pacific. Thus, with minimal interference from other great powers, the danger to Japan of war against several countries was greatly reduced.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 soon brought concrete results for Japan, as Tokyo had expected when it signed. Japan attacked Russia in 1904 and fought it the following year. This war was the result of an unyielding geopolitical rivalry between Russia and Japan. Essentially, it was a Japanese-Russian rivalry for control of northern China, i.e., Manchuria. It was surprising at the time that Japan, with its newly formed imperial arrogance, would attack Russia, but Japan nevertheless survived and became even stronger after the war against Russia.
In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Japan’s victory was less complete than popular legend suggests. Japan was exhausted and made peace after 18 months of a successful but exhausting war. After the war, Japan was in no position to demand the annexation of Manchuria (for which it had fought against Russia). Based on the peace treaty after the war, Japan was given the right to protect the South Manchurian Railway, which had been built with the help of Japanese capital. Nevertheless, this solution was historically fateful for the further history of Pacific Asia, because from these areas, Japan managed to expand its military-political power in the following years, even decades, until 1945.
This was the first of Japan’s major wars, which set a precedent for undiplomatic behavior. Namely, Japan began its war against Russia in the Pacific in 1904 with an undiplomatic precedent at the time: a direct, surprise attack on the anchored Russian Navy in Port Arthur without a declaration of war. A little later, on December 7th, 1941, Japan would repeat the same scenario only against the US Navy in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. However, as far as Japan was concerned, its behavior in the war against Russia towards prisoners of war, as well as Japan’s respect for international conventions, were exemplary (i.e., for any respect concerning international law).
Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that this alliance with Japan was also beneficial to Great Britain. The alliance guaranteed that Great Britain’s interests in the Far East would be protected if Great Britain were to enter the war in Europe in any way. However, if that happened, Great Britain could rely on Japan to preserve intact its overseas empire (thalassocracy) and primarily London’s interests in the Pacific Asia. In fact, this happened during the Great War of 1914‒1918 when Japan liquidated all German colonies in China. However, Great Britain was not entirely satisfied with Japan’s fulfillment of its contractual obligations to London, believing that Japan should have done much more for the benefit of the British Empire in the Pacific Asia.
However, for two decades, this Anglo-Japanese alliance formed the basis of Japanese policy in the Pacific Asia region. Within the framework of this alliance, Japan took the first successful steps towards establishing its Pacific Asia empire, the borders of which culminated in mid-1942. Ironically, the territorial expansion of this Japanese empire led Japan into World War II, i.e., into a war against its former ally, Great Britain. It is not incomprehensible that many Japanese conservatives at the time looked with melancholy and nostalgia at the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902‒1921, because this alliance embodied in modern Japanese history a period of international security that laid the foundations for Japanese imperial policy in the Pacific Asia region. The alliance was a diplomatic tool that brought Japan’s military-political power and international respect during its existence. At the same time, the alliance indicated the path that Japan should follow in its imperial policy.
The Washington Conference of 1921
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was dissolved in 1921 at the Washington Conference, as the problems in the Pacific Asia region after the Great War had become far more complicated. When the balance of power in this region was upset in 1915 because the Western powers were involved in the war on the European continent, Japan took advantage of this situation to secure its supremacy in the region. Thus, on January 18th, 1915, Tokyo delivered an ultimatum to China, which was called the 21 Demands in diplomatic circles. As a result, its acceptance would have ended even the limited independence of the northern parts of China. In other words, northern China would have been turned into a Japanese protectorate. Meanwhile, in 1905, Japan turned the Korean Peninsula (Chosen in Japanese) into its protectorate and even annexed it in 1910 during the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. This had previously been done with Taiwan in 1895. Russia was defeated in the Pacific in 1905, so the way was open for Japan to further imperial aggression towards northern China, which Japan would finally exploit in 1931 and later in 1937.
After January 1915, China was saved from final ruin by diplomatic intervention by the United States, with a military threat to Japan. In other words, instead of obtaining China’s surrender, Japan was forced to enter into diplomatic negotiations with the United States in 1917 (when Russia was paralyzed by revolutionary chaos), which, in principle, recognized Tokyo’s territorial claims, albeit in a non-specific, or rather vague, form. And then, when peace was established after the Great War, Japan had to suffer the humiliation of being forced to participate in the Washington Conference of 1921, convened by the United States, and thus join the other great powers interested in the Pacific Asia region by committing to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China. This was precisely what was directly detrimental to Japan’s imperialist-colonial plans and interests after the Great War.
The Washington Conference, among other things, also provided for a period during which there would be no port use agreements or extraterritorial (colonial) rights in China. The great powers were willing to allow China to join the kind of committee of states (League of Nations) as an equal country and welcomed the process of its modernization according to Western standards. These agreements were embodied in a document called the Nine Power Pact, which for 20 years was to serve as a reminder of the limitations that had constrained Japan from freely and unilaterally deciding the fate of China and the Pacific Asia. Because of this anti-Japanese treaty, Tokyo itself was very disappointed by the change in the attitudes of the great powers towards Japan’s regional policy, which was supposed to have a colonial-imperial character, following the example of the Western powers.
It was clear to Japan that this document was adopted as a consequence of the great powers’ relaxation of imperialist policies, given that the world was already divided in a colonial sense and that new colonial powers like Japan had virtually no place on the new post-war world map. The old Western colonial empires defended their positions in the world and did not allow the new powers to become their equals. This applied not only to Japan but also to Mussolini’s Italy and later Hitler’s Germany.
On the other hand, public opinion in the old colonial-imperialist powers questioned whether imperialism had actually paid off for these powers, i.e., whether the profits from the economic exploitation of China were worth the costs and dangers of keeping China under colonial occupation. Among more liberal circles, there was also a willingness to calmly accept the development of Chinese nationalism.
The dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921
Thus, in these new circumstances, the British decided to break the two-decade alliance with Japan in 1921, thus dealing a heavy blow to Japan’s security and patriotic feelings. All in all, London believed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 had done enough damage to British interests to make it less attractive to Great Britain. However, the interests of the United States were primarily behind the breakup of this alliance. Namely, the immediate motive that influenced London not to renew this alliance was pressure from the Canadian government, which reflected the opinion of Washington, given that the United States began to seriously feel a naval rivalry with Japan.
The initial phase of political tensions between Washington and Tokyo was conditioned by the success of American armament and the activities of its army and navy during the Great War. The main reason for the British yielding to American pressure to break the Anglo-Japanese alliance was London’s belief that Great Britain had a choice between the USA and Japan, a choice between the future and the past, and accordingly, the choice of alliance with the USA was a choice not only of Anglo-Saxon solidarity but also of practical benefit in the emerging post-war times. However, this fateful decision of British diplomacy was made without deeper reflection and a rational understanding of the geopolitical situation in which the Pacific Asia region found itself after the Great War. Ultimately, this decision was made without serious debate and presentation of arguments.
One of the main consequences of the termination of this alliance, i.e., the treaty, was that it effectively confirmed that the post-war world was divided along racial lines. Namely, since Great Britain in 1921 rejected the alliance with Japan, Japan was forced to see itself as a member of the Asian („yellow“) race and not the Western („white“) race, to present itself as the leader of the conquered Asian peoples, and finally to act in the following period as the liberator of the Asian peoples from Western colonial rule. And all this was forced upon it by Great Britain with its Asian policy after the Great War. This policy greatly contributed to the understanding in the interwar period that the tensions in this part of the world were expressed in the relationship of the „white“ race against the „yellow“ race.
After the dissolution of the alliance, Japan was once again expelled from the society of the Western great powers, i.e., the powers that determined the fate of both Asia and a large part of the (colonial) rest of the world, since they had the last word in global politics. Rejected from the Western circle of the strongest, Japan turned on itself, playing the card of a fighter for the equality of the „white“ and „yellow“ races in the Pacific Asia region. This is how it presented itself during the Total War (World War II) and even promoted its leadership in the struggle of the Asian „yellow“ race for liberation from the colonial slavery imposed on Asia by the Western „white“ race. This largely explains the great and rapid military successes of Japan in Southeast Asia in the first half of 1942, because many Asian peoples in this region perceived it as a fighter for the liberation of Asia from the colonial domination of the Western „white“ race.
Consequences of the breakup of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
After 1921, Japan could no longer be sure of the neutrality of most Western powers, and therefore sought to improve relations with those Western powers that were not hostile to it in the 1930s. As compensation for the old Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan had to be content with signing a treaty on the limitation of naval forces, under which Japan was recognized as one of the world’s greatest naval powers, a status it de facto held after the Great War. This treaty thus granted Japan a 3-to-5 ratio relative to the United States and Great Britain. However, this was still a weak compensation, since Japan did not gain a reliable friend and ally like Great Britain during the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
The dissolution of the alliance and the signing of the naval limitation agreement only revealed the divergence of interests between Japan and the Western powers. Whereas previously Japan could count on the British Navy as its real ally, and while the United States had previously pursued a policy guided solely by American interests, now, after the dissolution of the alliance and the signing of the naval agreement, both Great Britain and the United States had united and become potential enemies of Japan.
The next step in the deterioration of Japan’s relations with the USA and Great Britain took place in 1924, when the US Congress, racially disturbed by the large and sudden influx of Japanese emigration to the US, passed a law that deprived emigrants from Asia, including the Japanese, of any hope of being accepted as equal immigrants. At the same time, Australia became famous for its “White Australia” policy. The point was that all these de facto racist political steps of Western “democracies” finally convinced Asian “yellow” Japan that the Japanese did not belong to the white race and that, therefore, they could only be second-class Asians, and that representatives of the “white” race would be the leaders of world politics.
Because Great Britain renounced Japan in 1921 as its main partner and ally in the region, Japan was effectively forced from then on (until 1940) to seek a new ally or allies among the great world powers that could provide it with the same national security and/or fulfillment of national interests in the region as Great Britain had done from 1902 to 1921 against Russia.
Diplomatic and interventionist efforts by Western powers thwarted Japan’s policy to halt China’s economic and political recovery. Japan was effectively forced to retreat and, therefore, temporarily abandon its imperial policy in the region, as it still lacked self-confidence vis-à-vis the Western powers. Nevertheless, the stage was set for a decisive confrontation, for which Japan was prepared in alliance with its new European allies – Germany and Italy, which, in Tokyo’s opinion, could provide Japan with security like Great Britain had recently. Thus, Japan, unlike in the Great War, found itself on the side of its Anglo-Saxon adversaries during the Total War.
Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirović
Former University Professor (Vilnius, Lithuania)
Research Fellow at Centre for Geostrategic Studies (Belgrade, Serbia)
Research Associate of Centre for Research on Globalization (Montreal, Canada)
