Introduction: The Cycle of Attrition and the Strategic Deadlock
Since the end of the Second World War, nuclear deterrence has become one of the fundamental pillars of the international security order, but its effectiveness in addressing regional crises remains a subject of intense debate.
For more than two decades, Iran’s nuclear dossier has been trapped in a recurring cycle of resistance, international pressure, low-intensity military confrontations, and prolonged, often inconclusive negotiations, with the most tangible consequence being increasingly broad financial and energy sanctions on Iranian society and the economy.
The question remains open: how long can this cycle continue? Does nuclear deterrence genuinely enhance security? Can Iran’s case be reinterpreted through the main theories of international relations?
To answer this, four concepts must be distinguished: Nuclear Energy, the peaceful use of the technology; Nuclear Weapons, military instruments; Nuclear Latency, the technical capability to build a weapon without actually producing one; and Nuclear Deterrence, the doctrine that prevents conflict through the credible threat of force. Conflating these concepts often leads to misleading interpretations.
1. Theoretical Framework: The Security Dilemma and the Logic of Deterrence
Within realism, many nuclear crises can be explained through the Security Dilemma: measures a state takes to increase its own security are perceived by others as a threat, fueling mistrust and military competition. Iran’s nuclear programme and the Western response are a classic example of this dynamic.
The literature is divided over the consequences of proliferation. Kenneth Waltz argues that a gradual spread of nuclear weapons may favor Strategic Stability: once a state acquires a credible Second Strike Capability, the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) makes direct aggression unlikely, and credible deterrence becomes a tool for stability.
Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling saw deterrence not as mere willingness to use force but as the capacity to shape an adversary’s strategic calculations: its success depends on the Credibility of Threat, that is, on the adversary concluding that the costs of aggression outweigh the benefits.
Taking the opposite view, Scott Sagan, drawing on organizational theory, argues that many emerging states lack institutions solid enough to safely manage nuclear arsenals: more nuclear-armed states means greater risk of miscalculation, accidents, and a regional Proliferation Cascade.
This theoretical divide shows how nuclear capability can be read, depending on the approach, either as a stabilizing factor or as a source of new crises.
2. Historical Evidence and the Challenges of the NPT
After India and Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities in 1998, the two countries have avoided another full-scale conventional war. The literature describes this through the Stability–Instability Paradox: deterrence reduces the probability of total war but can favor limited conflicts and proxy wars, as in the 1999 Kargil War.
In North Korea’s case, many scholars believe its nuclear programme shifted US policy from a logic of Regime Change toward Crisis Management.
These experiences fuel the debate over the NPT. Critics argue that formally recognizing only five nuclear powers has created Double Standards, especially given nuclear-armed states outside the Treaty. Supporters counter that Article IV recognizes member states’ right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
From this perspective, the core issue in Iran’s dossier is not the right to civilian nuclear energy itself, but the level of uranium enrichment, the scope of the programme, and international verification mechanisms — the balance underlying the debate on Nuclear Latency: maintaining advanced technological capability without declaring a shift to weapons.
3. Technical and Political Challenges in Strategic Assessments
According to several international think tanks, Iran is now considered a Nuclear Threshold State, but its options remain constrained by technical, political, and economic challenges.
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has repeatedly faced military pressure, sabotage, and cyberattacks, while reduced access for IAEA inspectors has increased Strategic Ambiguity. The central technical issue today is the resilience of enrichment facilities, especially underground ones, against possible preventive strikes.
Domestically, renewed sanctions and structural inflation weigh on Iran’s economy. From the Constructivist perspective, social cohesion and public trust in institutions are essential variables for the success of any foreign policy strategy: no international strategy can hold in the long run without internal stability.
4. Possible Scenarios for Iran’s Foreign Policy
First scenario — reviving diplomacy: a comprehensive new agreement reducing sanctions while guaranteeing Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy (including scientific and medical uses, such as radiopharmaceuticals) under Article IV of the NPT. The main obstacle remains the deep erosion of mutual trust.
Second scenario — maintaining Nuclear Latency: Iran would continue developing its capabilities without building a weapon, preserving indirect deterrence while avoiding the diplomatic costs of leaving the NPT or facing new sanctions.
Third scenario — transitioning to full nuclear deterrence: according to some scholars of structural realism, only full deterrence capability could reduce Western Compellence over Iran, but this carries major risks: preventive strikes before the programme’s completion, or further economic and diplomatic isolation.
Conclusion
Whatever theoretical approach or scenario seems most convincing, one fact is now clear: Iran’s nuclear dossier is no longer just a technical dispute over enrichment levels, but a structural component of Middle Eastern security architecture and the global non-proliferation regime.
For realism, nuclear deterrence can reduce the likelihood of direct confrontation between major powers. For liberal and constructivist theories, however, sustainable security requires effective international institutions, arms control, and mutual trust-building — which is why the debate remains open.
Perhaps the most important lesson of eighty years of the nuclear age is that deterrence, while it may have helped prevent some direct conflicts among major powers, has never replaced diplomacy, arms control, and political dialogue. The future of Iran’s nuclear dossier will therefore depend not only on its technological capabilities, but on whether the security architecture of the Middle East can be redefined, and on the willingness of regional and international actors to reduce the Security Dilemma that continues to fuel mistrust and strategic competition in the region.
