Sir Walter Raleigh wrote in the sixteenth century: “Whoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade commands the riches; and whoever commands the riches commands the world itself.” The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis showed how relevant that idea still is. Even the threat of a chokepoint closure was enough to shake energy markets, disrupt trade flows, and send shockwaves through the global economy.
A similar strategic corridor lies close to Bangladesh, near the Strait of Malacca. Bangladesh sits at the northern edge of the Bay of Bengal, along key sea lanes linking the Indian Ocean with the Strait of Malacca and East Asia, routes vital to major Asian economies. These same routes also carry a significant share of energy exports from the Middle East and the Gulf, including Iranian oil destined for Asian markets, making the region important not only for trade but also for global energy security. Its 580-kilometre coastline lies in one of the Indo-Pacific’s most contested maritime zones. India borders it to the west and north, while to the east, Myanmar’s civil war has allowed the Arakan Army to establish de facto control over much of resource-rich Rakhine State, an area hold significant rare earth deposits.
Washington has long viewed Bangladesh as strategically significant. From the Bay of Bengal, it offers visibility over regional naval activity, energy flows, and key trade routes linking Asia, the Middle East, and global markets. Shortly after independence in 1971, the United States explored the possibility of a military presence in the region, but Bangladesh declined on a simple principle: a state born from a struggle for sovereignty cannot preserve it by hosting a permanent foreign base. Successive governments have largely maintained that position.
More recently, discussions around GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) and ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) have gained momentum. GSOMIA would create a framework for classified information sharing with the United States, which could gradually narrow Bangladesh’s space for independent assessment and strategic neutrality. ACSA is more operational, allowing U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels to receive logistical support through Bangladeshi ports and airfields.
The United States has no direct military presence in the Bay of Bengal, a gap called the “missing link” between Diego Garcia and Singapore. With uncertainty over Diego Garcia due to the Chagos dispute, Bangladesh’s location could matter more as a connector for intelligence sharing, refueling, and wider operations without a formal base. Over time, this kind of arrangement can pull local facilities into a wider military network, creating what strategists call a “soft base” a node in an extended system that offers many of the advantages of a permanent presence without openly establishing one.
For decades, Bangladesh has anchored its foreign policy in “friendship to all, malice toward none,” which has helped it maintain balanced ties with competing powers. Moving closer to the United States through agreements like GSOMIA and ACSA could slowly narrow that flexibility and raise concerns among key regional partners.
China is likely to view such developments with concern. A large share of its trade, supply chains, and rare earth resources passes through the Bay of Bengal toward the Strait of Malacca. This vulnerability lies at the heart of what former Chinese President Hu Jintao called the “Malacca Dilemma,” China’s dependence on sea lanes that are both vital and exposed.
Iran’s oil exports also move largely toward China, which has become its biggest buyer after U.S. sanctions restricted access to many other markets. This adds another layer of dependence on the same wider maritime system, where energy flows are just as exposed as trade routes. China is itself heavily dependent on imported energy, making these sea lanes even more critical. Most of Iran’s oil travels through the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf corridors before entering Asian markets, supplying not only China but also helping sustain the wider energy needs of Asia’s interconnected economies. Any disruption would therefore carry a double impact, tightening China’s energy supply while straining Iran’s economy, with ripple effects felt across regional energy markets and supply chains.
The Taiwan issue adds further weight. China sees Taiwan as part of its territory, while the United States continues to support Taiwan’s security under its long-standing policy. A stronger U.S. presence in the wider region would increase Washington’s leverage around Taiwan and pressure China, and any expanded U.S. military access in Bangladesh would likely be interpreted in Beijing as part of this broader strategic picture.
Taiwan’s importance also lies in its dominance of semiconductor production, led by TSMC, which anchors global AI and defense supply chains. Like Japan and South Korea, it depends on secure sea routes through the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean. The stakes go beyond China. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all rely on these sea lanes for energy, trade, and industry. Japan imports almost all its energy, South Korea is heavily import dependent, and Taiwan depends on them to sustain its semiconductor industry. Any disruption would quickly push up costs, delay supplies, and ripple across East Asia.
Bangladesh is part of this same maritime network. It depends on these routes for imports such as fuel, cotton, machinery, industrial raw materials, and consumer goods. Any disruption in the Bay of Bengal would therefore directly affect Bangladesh’s economy through higher costs, supply shortages, and trade delays. It could also complicate relations with key economic partners such as China, Japan, and South Korea, which are among Bangladesh’s largest trading partners and have financed major infrastructure, energy, and development projects. A deterioration in regional stability could affect trade, investment, and future development cooperation. For Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, and Dhaka alike, stability in these waters matters far more than turning the region into another arena of strategic rivalry.
India’s position is more complex than it first appears. New Delhi is not opposed to US engagement in the region and is itself part of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). Through the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India already maintains strong oversight of key sea lanes toward the Strait of Malacca. A deeper U.S. operational presence in Bangladesh would introduce another external actor into what India may regard as its immediate strategic neighborhood, a shift India is unlikely to welcome. At the same time, Bangladesh and India share a long-standing and multidimensional relationship built over decades, covering trade, water-sharing, connectivity, and security cooperation. Any major shift in Bangladesh’s strategic orientation would inevitably be viewed through the broader lens of regional stability and long-term bilateral interests.
In Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the Arakan Army now controls much of the border area, leaving Bangladesh in parts of its frontier facing a non-state armed group rather than a stable government. With its own administration and territorial control, its priorities diverge from Dhaka’s. Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), the military junta, formally governs the country, but its authority on the ground is increasingly weakened by the ongoing civil war. The conflict has also pulled in outside actors. Through the “Burma Act”, the United States has expanded engagement with parts of Myanmar’s wider opposition landscape, while groups such as the Arakan Army and other armed actors continue to shape realities on the ground. China, meanwhile, is focused on protecting key interests, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor to Kyaukphyu and its oil and gas pipelines that bypass the Strait of Malacca. India and Thailand remain engaged mainly on border security, refugees, and regional stability.
Bangladesh sits in a sensitive overlap of regional pressures. The Chittagong Hill Tracts remain only partly settled despite the 1997 Peace Accord, which still complicates border management. Linking Bangladesh’s intelligence and logistics systems to external security frameworks tied to Myanmar’s conflict through GSOMIA and ACSA would not reduce risk. Instead, it could deepen exposure to a conflict it did not create and cannot easily control. What began as Myanmar’s internal conflict has now widened into a regional problem, with spillover already affecting Bangladesh.
Russia is an important strategic partner for Bangladesh, especially in energy, defense, and infrastructure. For decades, Dhaka has followed a balanced foreign policy, building working ties with competing powers rather than leaning too closely toward any single bloc. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant demonstrates the depth of Bangladesh-Russia cooperation. Built with Russian technology and financing, it is a long-term strategic project. As Bangladesh’s energy needs grow, the challenge is to keep that cooperation steady while also preserving flexibility in foreign policy. Closer alignment with Washington could limit Bangladesh’s room to work with Moscow, especially given wider U.S.-Russia tensions. At the same time, deeper security or intelligence ties with Russia’s rivals could be seen in Moscow as a shift in Bangladesh’s position, affecting trust, trade, and long-term cooperation.
GSOMIA and ACSA are described as technical security arrangements, but their impact can extend beyond routine state affairs. Over time, such frameworks can influence how decisions are made inside the state. As cooperation deepens with major powers, military and intelligence bodies often become the main channels for sensitive external engagement, gradually concentrating influence in areas that were earlier more clearly under civilian control. This shift usually develops in three stages. First, Security institutions especially the military, start to take on a bigger role in handling sensitive cooperation. Over time, they become the main channel for classified work, which naturally gives them more resources and greater influence. Second, elected governments may start depending more on these channels for key foreign and defense decisions, with much of the process gradually moving outside regular public or parliamentary scrutiny. Third, that can slowly create distance inside the system. As things become less transparent, a gap starts to open between civilian leadership and security agencies, and over time that gap only grows wider.
Pakistan offers a cautionary example. In 1954, shortly after independence, Pakistan entered into a mutual defense agreement with the United States, such as SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). Over time, the military and intelligence set-up moved beyond its core defense role and began shaping politics, foreign policy, and key national decisions. Gradually, decision-making power began moving away from elected institutions, with the military emerging as the de facto center of power. Repeated coups and extended periods of military rule weakened democratic continuity, and elected governments rarely completed their terms. This created a system often described as a “state within a state,” where informal power runs alongside formal institutions. Pakistan’s experience shows that security partnerships are not just about defense cooperation; over time, they can quietly reshape internal power balance and weaken civilian authority for decades.
As Bangladesh deepens its engagement with Washington through GSOMIA and ACSA, it may be seen as a shift in alignment, even if that is not the intent. For decades, Bangladesh has worked to keep a careful balance and maintain its image of neutrality in external relations. The space built over the years doesn’t just disappear overnight. It will slowly get narrower as other partners quietly adjust how they engage with Bangladesh. Over time, this can leave Bangladesh increasingly isolated in strategic and economic terms, with fewer options and less flexibility in navigating a complex geopolitical environment. They may reduce investment and trade, slow cooperation, and grow more cautious across energy, defense, and development ties, tightening Bangladesh’s economic space at a time when it still depends heavily on external trade and investment. By moving into deeper security engagement, Bangladesh could also find itself drawn into great-power competition unintentionally, while making other countries more cautious in how they balance their own relations with Dhaka. This can weaken Bangladesh’s traditional ability to keep all sides comfortable, reduce diplomatic flexibility, and increase dependence on a narrower set of partners, limiting strategic autonomy.
Once Bangladesh loses the trust of partner countries, it becomes very hard to win it back. And with that, what we lose is their confidence in working with us.
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The Writer:
“Kollol Kibria is an advocate by profession, political analyst, and human rights activist whose work encompasses international affairs, diplomacy, policy analysis, international trade law, treaties, and energy governance. He examines the evolution of the international order while also engaging with political, governance, and development issues in Bangladesh within a broader global context.”
