Viewing foreign policy from a perspective oriented toward peace naturally draws attention to military buildup and rising tensions. But what emerges if, at least initially, we set that judgment aside and look coolly at what international media see or fear in the foreign policy of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi?
When she took office in October 2025, the dominant portrait of Takaichi was straightforward: political heir to Shinzo Abe, conservative, a security “hawk”, tough on China and supportive of constitutional revision. Her ties with Taiwan and visits to Yasukuni Shrine were also repeatedly noted. The shrine honors Japan’s war dead, including 14 Class-A war criminals, and is therefore deeply controversial in China and South Korea.[1]
Almost a year later, the question has shifted: not only “Is Takaichi a hawk?”, but “How does she act in diplomatic practice?”
United States — A reliable ally, but how autonomous?
From Washington, the centrality of the alliance stands out first. With Donald Trump, Takaichi has drawn on Abe’s legacy, combining personal diplomacy, investment, critical minerals and defense.[2] For the U.S. security establishment, a Japan more actively engaged in deterrence toward China is a desirable ally.
The Financial Times has highlighted the other side of the coin: faced with Trump’s unpredictability, Tokyo has no real “Plan B”.[3] Nor does Takaichi automatically accept every U.S. request. On the Strait of Hormuz, the government cited legal limits on the use of the Self-Defense Forces and prioritized diplomacy.[4] How much autonomous room can Japan create inside an alliance that remains indispensable?
Europe — What is Japan becoming?
In major European media, Japan’s defense buildup is also read as a transformation of its postwar identity. Le Monde has focused on Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, the “pacifist clause” by which Japan renounces war and restricts the use of force.[5]
Arms exports, counterstrike capabilities, constitutional revision and debate over the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” — not possessing, producing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons — raise a broader question: as Japan grows militarily stronger, what does it retain of the postwar Japan?[6]
Australia — Toward a more autonomous regional role?
In May 2026, Takaichi described the relationship with Canberra as a “quasi-alliance”, expanding cooperation in defense, energy, critical minerals and economic security.[7] ABC highlighted a shared dilemma: continuing to rely on the United States while reducing the risk of depending on Washington alone.[8]
A denser network with Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, India and Southeast Asia could widen Tokyo’s room for maneuver. It is still too early, however, to speak of strategic autonomy.
South Korea — Separating history from cooperation
In South Korea, initial expectations were negative. The background included Yasukuni, Japanese colonial rule, the issue of the “comfort women” — women, many of them Korean, who were coerced into Japan’s military brothel system — and that of Korean laborers mobilized during colonial rule.
Relations with President Lee Jae-myung have nevertheless proved more stable than expected. The two leaders have intensified meetings and cooperation on energy, critical minerals, supply chains, North Korea and coordination with the United States.[9]
Takaichi has not changed her view of history. The question is whether she can separate ideological convictions from the day-to-day management of relations between states. The historical disputes remain unresolved; the durability of this pragmatism will be an important test.
China — Before managing the conflict comes the “political foundation”
A caveat is needed when reading mainland Chinese media: Xinhua, CGTN, China Daily and Global Times are much closer to the official positions of the government and the Communist Party than major Western newspapers. They therefore mainly show China’s public and semi-official image of Takaichi’s foreign policy.
Takaichi’s November 2025 remarks that a conflict over Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan are presented as the fundamental cause of the deterioration. Beijing argues that they undermine the “political foundation” set by the four basic political documents governing China-Japan relations since the 1972 Joint Communiqué.[10]
China Daily links those remarks to Japan’s military buildup, arms exports and the security-cooperation network being built by Tokyo, accusing the government of speaking of “stable relations” while moving in the opposite direction.[11]
Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post adds a different element: Chinese pressure has not necessarily weakened Takaichi, and Beijing has struggled to rally Asian countries against Japan.[12] China’s response, too, can harden the regional environment.
Southeast Asia — Trust, but without bloc politics
Japan still enjoys a high level of trust in Southeast Asia. The Straits Times has described deeper ties with ASEAN as a form of “enlightened self-interest”: strengthening regional resilience also protects Japanese supply chains.[13]
The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, however, points to an important reservation. Japan’s military strengthening is not necessarily rejected; it would become problematic if it were too confrontational, marginalized ASEAN or pushed the region toward bloc politics.[14] Many countries appear to want not simply a “stronger” Japan, but one that expands their room for choice.
Six perspectives, six different criteria
Saying that “positive” and “negative” assessments of Takaichi coexist abroad explains little. In the United States, the focus is on allied capability and autonomy; in Europe, on the transformation of postwar Japan’s identity; in Australia, on the capacity to help sustain regional order; in South Korea, on separating historical disputes from practical cooperation; in Chinese media, on Tokyo’s distance from the traditional political foundation of bilateral relations; and in Southeast Asia, on whether a stronger Japan widens or narrows other countries’ choices.
Can we really measure these six readings by the same yardstick? Probably not: they embody six different criteria of “good diplomacy”.
At least in the practical management of foreign policy, Takaichi is beginning to move beyond the initial image of a simple “Abe heir” and “anti-China hawk”. She remains tough toward Beijing, but does not automatically follow Washington; she cooperates pragmatically with Seoul and is broadening ties with Australia and Southeast Asia.
It would nevertheless be premature to call all this “strategic autonomy”. For now, there are glimpses of a search: keeping the U.S. alliance as the central axis while thickening other relationships in order to widen Japan’s room for action.
Will that search evolve toward greater autonomy within the alliance, or mainly reinforce a U.S.-centered security network? It is still too early to answer.
One question therefore remains: what is missing from this map? Having clarified the criteria used by the major media, we can move to the next stage: bringing into view what has been left out.
Notes and sources:
[1] Reuters, 21.10.2025; AP, 15.08.2026.
[8] ABC Asia, 04.05.2026.
[2] Reuters, 28.10.2025.
[9] Associated Press, 19.05.2026.
[3] Financial Times, 20.08.2026.
[10] Xinhua, 07.05.2026.
[4] Reuters, 18.03.2026.
[11] China Daily, 29.07.2026.
[5] Le Monde, 14.08.2026.
[12] South China Morning Post, 19.03.2026.
[6] Le Monde, 06.08.2026.
[13] The Straits Times, 21.05.2026.
[7] ABC News Australia, 04.05.2026.
[14] ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 04.02.2026.
