“Mayun barely appears on the maps of power. But it is located in one of those places where geography can transform a few square kilometers of land into a piece capable of unsettling oil companies, shipping lines, governments, and markets.”
I. THE ISLAND THAT IS NOT AN ISLAND
The Houthis of Yemen have taken the island of Mayun, also known as Perim, located virtually in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The news might seem like just another episode in Yemen’s endless war. It is not. Houthi forces have also advanced on coastal positions and on Dhubab, reinforcing a territorial presence that gives them an extraordinary ability to exert pressure on one of the planet’s fundamental maritime routes.
Mayun matters very little for what it possesses and enormously for where it is located. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea. From there, ships can continue toward the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. It is one of those points where the vastness of world trade must pass through an extraordinarily narrow geographic space.
“There are territories whose power is measured not by what they contain, but by everything that may be forced to pass in front of them.”
II. GEOGRAPHY BECOMES POWER
The numbers make it possible to understand the scale. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, during the second quarter of 2026 around 8.1 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products passed through Bab el-Mandeb, compared with 5.6 million during the first quarter. The increase was directly related to disruptions affecting other Middle Eastern energy routes.
This turns the strait into far more than a Yemeni problem. A major disruption forces numerous ships to abandon the Red Sea and Suez route and sail around the Cape of Good Hope. The EIA estimates that a diversion of this kind can add approximately 15 days to certain voyages between the Arabian Sea and Europe. More days mean fuel, crews, insurance, freight costs, and ultimately higher prices.
“Bab el-Mandeb demonstrates an ancient rule of geopolitics. The oceans are immense, but world trade passes through only a handful of gates.”
III. IRAN BEHIND THE BOARD
The Houthis cannot be analyzed separately from Iran. Tehran has supported the movement for years, and the current advance objectively expands Iran’s capacity to exert pressure on its regional adversaries, although that does not mean that every Houthi decision is simply an order sent from Tehran. That distinction matters.
Iran perfectly understands the strategic value of these positions. At one end of the board lies Hormuz, the outlet of the Persian Gulf. At the other appears Bab el-Mandeb, the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Between them lie some of the planet’s most sensitive energy arteries. Pressure on both routes at the same time multiplies the problem far beyond the simple sum of two conflicts.
There is no need to sink a ship in order to alter trade. It is enough to increase the risk sufficiently for insurers, shipping companies, and operators to begin calculating another route.
“In maritime trade, fear also sails, and many times it reaches port before the ships do.”
IV. SAUDI ARABIA DISCOVERS THE OTHER GATE
For Saudi Arabia, the move is especially delicate. Riyadh has the East-West Pipeline, which makes it possible to transport oil from its eastern fields to terminals on the Red Sea. That infrastructure provides precisely a strategic alternative when the Persian Gulf route becomes dangerous. But there is an extraordinary paradox.
Once the oil reaches the Red Sea, part of its route toward Asia once again depends on Bab el-Mandeb.
Reuters also reported that the Saudi-backed Yemeni government is preparing a response, while the situation once again increases the possibility of attacks and counterattacks. Axios reported that Mohammed bin Salman asked Donald Trump for U.S. strikes against the Houthis, while Washington tries to support Riyadh without directly opening another military front.
“Geography eventually traps even those who possess enormous economic and military resources.”
V. THE LIONS WATCH THE STRAIT
The United States sees a route that is fundamental to trade and to its allies. China looks at exactly the same chokepoint from the opposite end, because its economy depends extraordinarily on maritime trade between Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. India cannot regard it as a distant conflict either. Its trade, its energy imports, and its position in the Indian Ocean inevitably make it an interested actor.
Russia occupies a particularly interesting position. EIA data show that during 2024 and the first half of 2025 Russian crude continued to move through Suez and Bab el-Mandeb toward Asian markets, especially India, and its ships were attacked far less frequently than other traffic. Europe, meanwhile, watches from the Suez end as every disruption once again lengthens the economic distance separating it from Asia.
“The great lions may possess aircraft carriers, missiles, satellites, and nuclear arsenals. But none of them can widen a strait through a diplomatic resolution.”
VI. THE INVISIBLE PRICE OF A DISTANT WAR
Here appears the citizen who has never heard of Mayun. He may live in Madrid, Santiago, Mumbai, Shanghai, or Hamburg. He will never visit Yemen. He will probably never see Bab el-Mandeb either. Yet he may end up indirectly paying for what happens there.
When the cost of maritime transport rises, the chain continues. Insurance and freight costs increase. Logistics times lengthen. More capital remains tied up in goods at sea. Some supply chains require larger inventories. And ultimately part of the cost reaches companies and consumers.
“Modern war possesses this brutal characteristic. It can begin thousands of kilometers away and silently enter the door of a home transformed into inflation.”
VII. THE REAL POWER OF MAYUN
The Houthis do not need to completely close Bab el-Mandeb in order to gain strategic influence. Controlling territory near shipping lanes, demonstrating military capability, and maintaining uncertainty may be enough to alter business and government decisions. Nor does this mean that they can automatically control every ship that crosses the strait. Territorial control, the capacity to threaten, and absolute control of navigation are different things.
That precision matters because around these events another battle immediately begins: the battle of propaganda. For some, the Houthis will be Iranian instruments. For others, Yemeni resistance. For others, a threat to global navigation. The labels change depending on who writes the communiqué.
“Geography, by contrast, remains exactly in the same place.”
VIII. THE NARROW GATE
Mayun reminds us of an uncomfortable reality of the twenty-first century. We have built a gigantic planetary economy on surprisingly narrow corridors. Hormuz, Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez, and Panama are small geographic hinges holding up an enormous economic door.
The problem is not only who controls an island today and who may recover it tomorrow. The greater problem is that we have created an extraordinarily interdependent civilization while continuing to resolve too many differences through blockades, missiles, sanctions, threats, and wars.
The Houthis have taken Mayun. Saudi Arabia calculates. Iran watches. The United States measures how far it should intervene. China, India, Russia, and Europe watch the routes. Shipping companies calculate risks. Markets calculate prices.
“And a small island that millions of people had never even heard named has suddenly appeared on the board of global power.”
“Great empires tend to look at the size of their armies. Geography, far older than all of them, continues to remind them that sometimes the entire world must pass through a narrow gate.”
Bibliography
Reuters, September 11, 2026.
Associated Press, September 11, 2026.
U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Ch
